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Abstract. The so-called “argument from vagueness”, the clearest formulation of which is to
be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is among the most powerful and inno-
vative arguments offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants.
The argument is defective—I submit—and in a number of ways that is worth looking into.
But each “defect”, each gap in the argument, corresponds to a model of change that is inde-
pendently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the
world. So once all the gaps of the argument are filled in, the three-dimensionalist is left
with the burden of a response that cannot rely on a passive plea for common sense. The
argument is not a threat to common sense as such; it is a threat to the three-dimensionalist
faithfulness to common sense.
Introduction
Things change. Bananas ripen, houses deteriorate, people lose hairs and ac-
quire new body cells. How can we say that they are the same things, if they
are no longer the same? What grounds our belief that the things around us
(and ourselves, too) may survive from day to day, in spite of the many
changes that affect them? In this world of flux, persisting things are the only
anchor we have, but the source of their persistence appears to be a genuine
puzzle—a puzzle that has been with us since the Presocratics.
Today, a growing number of philosophers believe that the puzzle be-
trays a wrong metaphysics of persistence. Don’t think of time as a special
dimension along which objects continue to exist—they say. Just think of
time as another dimension along which objects extend, just as they extend
across the three spatial dimensions. Then the puzzle disappears. Just as an
object can change in space, insofar as its spatial parts can have different
properties, so it can change in time—its temporal parts can have different
properties. Just as we say of a banana that it is spoiled here but not there
insofar as this part of the banana is spoiled but that part isn’t, we can say of
the banana that it is ripe today but not yesterday insofar as today’s tempo-
2ral part of the banana is ripe but yesterday’s part isn’t. We have got the
same thing—the same banana—but its temporal parts are not quite alike, just
as its spatial parts are not alike. It changes over time just as it changes over
space: its change is a function of its having spatio-temporal parts that are not
qualitatively identical.
This way of resetting the issue is extremely effective but also, of
course, deeply revisionary. There is no question that common sense is based
on a three-dimensional conception of objects—a conception according to
which objects such as people and bananas, unlike events such as lives and
soccer games, extend exclusively across the three spatial dimensions and per-
sist through time by being fully present at different times—and the claim
that this is a “wrong” metaphysics can hardly be taken light-heartedly. True,
the scientific picture of the world seems to provide evidence in favor of the
claim, at least since the formulation of special relativity theory. But for
many philosophers the challenge is to make the scientific picture compatible
with common sense, not to replace one for the other. So to reset the issue
along the lines indicated above is to trade one problem for another: the phi-
losophical dispute about the problem of change turns into a controversy
about the metaphysical make-up of the things that change. And that is no
easier question to settle.
Can it be settled? One striking feature of the recent debate on these
matters is that many more arguments have been offered in favor of the revi-
sionary, four-dimensional conception than in support of the traditional,
three-dimensional view. Part of the reason is that the latter view is hardly in
need of any intuitive “justification”, whereas the former cries for independ-
ent evidence. The three-dimensionalist can therefore play defensively: in the
absence of decisive evidence to the contrary, the traditional conception of
objects as enduring continuants is all but metaphysically wrong-headed, even
if it requires taking the problem of change at face value. And most three-
dimensionalists would insist that none of the arguments offered by their op-
ponents is decisive enough. Still, as the arguments pile up the burden of de-
fense gets heavier, and the three-dimensionalists can no longer satisfy them-
selves with the generic support that comes from the intuitive plausibility of
their view. Adherence to common sense is a desideratum, not a strength.
One argument that has been put forward recently is particularly in-
structive in this regard, and that is what I intend to focus on in this paper. It
is the so-called “argument from vagueness”, the clearest formulation of which
3is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism (2001). The argu-
ment is instructive because it is easy to find it defective and to rest content
with such a diagnosis. However, to reject an argument as defective is to ac-
cept at least one of the countermodels that it engenders, or to reject one of
the premises. For example, to reject the so-called “argument from temporary
intrinsics” is to accept a model of change according to which all putative
properties are in fact relations to time, or a model according to which the
only properties an object has are its present properties, or a model according
to which the instantiation of a property by an object is relativized to times,
and so on. Three-dimensionalists may have different views regarding these
models, and such differences will affect the details of their metaphysical
story. But all such models are, in some important way, compatible with the
common-sense picture of the world that three-dimensionalism is meant to
defend. With the argument from vagueness the situation is different. The ar-
gument is defective, and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But
each “defect”, I will argue, corresponds to a model of change that is inde-
pendently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense
picture of the world. So the argument as such is not a knock-down, that is
true. But once all the gaps are filled in, the challenges it raises are nonetheless
serious, and one is left with the burden of a response that can no longer rely
on a passive plea for common sense. The argument is not a threat to common
sense as such; it is a threat to the three-dimensionalist faithfulness to com-
mon sense.
2. The Argument from Vagueness
Let me first review Sider’s formulation. In a nutshell, the argument says that
four-dimensionalism is the only plausible metaphysics of persistence unless
one is willing to countenance some form of ontic indeterminacy, i.e., unless
one is willing to say that there is vagueness in the world. The reason is that
four-dimensionalism would afford the only way to provide the question
“Under what conditions do objects come into and go out of existence?” with
a plausible and definite answer. Other views— three-dimensionalism in
primis—would be committed to answers that are either implausible or else
irredeemably vague, and vague in a way that can only be explained in terms
of ontic indeterminacy.
4Let’s see how this goes in detail. Consider the following question—
henceforth the Diachronic Composition Question: Given various times and
various objects existing at each, under what conditions will there be some-
thing that is composed of all and only those objects at those times? More
precisely:
(Q) Given a class of time instants, I, and a function ƒ assigning a non-empty
class of objects, ƒ(t), to each t in I, under what conditions will there be an
object, x, that exists exactly at the times in I and that at each such time t
is composed exactly by the objects in ƒ(t)?
Notice that such an object x, if it existed, would be a persisting object whose
mereological composition at each relevant time is specified by the function ƒ.
So in the end the Diachronic Composition Question amounts to this: Under
what conditions does ƒ identify a sequence of aggregates that add up to the
career of a persisting object? In Sider’s terminology: Under what conditions
does ƒ have a (minimal) diachronic fusion?
Now, on the face of it, there are only three possible answers to this
question:
(A1) Under no conditions at all (Nihilism)
(A2) Under certain conditions but not under others (Moderatism)
(A3) Under any conditions whatsoever (Universalism)
One might observe that, strictly speaking, nihilism is logically inconsistent
unless composition is understood as strict composition, i.e., composition by
proper parts. After all, every mereological atom is a fusion of itself, so when
I is a singleton, {t}, and ƒ(t) is itself a singleton, {x}, then there surely is an
object that fits the bill, namely x itself. On the other hand, with composition
understood as strict composition, the nihilist answer is hardly tenable
(though there are philosophers who sympathize with it—e.g. Rosen and
Dorr 2002). Surely there are mereologically complex objects. My body, for
example, is composed of body cells. That is, if the relevant class of times, I,
consists of the times at which my body exists, and if the various objects ex-
isting at each such time are those body cells of mine that exist at that time,
then there is something that consists of all and only those objects at those
times— namely, my body. At least, this is hardly negotiable if we are inter-
ested in a comparison between three-dimensionalism and four-dimension-
alism vis-à-vis common sense; a metaphysics according to which the world
5consists of time-bound mereological atoms is beyond the point. So, one way
or the other, the nihilist answer is out of the game. The real alternative here is
between the second answer and the third—between moderatism and univer-
salism—and this is essentially the option between asserting some form of
restricted composition versus asserting unrestricted composition. Sider ar-
gues that moderatism entails ontological vagueness—which is bad—and con-
cludes that universalism, the only remaining option, entails four-dimension-
alism.
Why should moderatism entail ontological vagueness? Intuitively, a
moderate answer to the Diachronic Composition Question is certainly plau-
sible and many philosophers have tried to specify the relevant conditions.
David Wiggins (1980), for example, famously tried to come up with condi-
tions that match up with ordinary intuitions, and many have followed in his
footsteps. But—Sider argues—this is illusory. No such moderate answer can
be given. That is, no moderate ontologically determinate answer can be given.
Sider’s reasoning here is a generalization (and correction) of a line of reason-
ing briefly put forward by David Lewis (1986, pp. 211ff). It comes in two
parts. First, it is claimed that any restricting conditions on composition
—whether synchronic or diachronic—are bound to be vague. Second, it is
argued that if the conditions under which composition obtains were vague, it
would be a vague matter how many objects there are, hence the vagueness in
question would have to be of the ontological sort.
Concerning the first point—to the effect that any restricting conditions
on composition would have to be vague—consider first synchronic composi-
tion, i.e., composition at-a-time. There is no question that we feel more at
ease with certain composites than with others. We feel at ease, for instance,
with the thought that there is such a thing as the fusion of all body cells that
currently make up my body; but when it comes to such unlovely and gerry-
mandered mixtures as Lewis’s (1991) trout-turkeys—those objects that con-
sist of the front half of a trout and the back half of a turkey—we feel uncom-
fortable. The question is: Is there any principled way of drawing a line be-
tween those composites that we find acceptable and those that make us
queasy? And Lewis’s answer is in the negative: everything is queer to a de-
gree, so any restriction on mereological composition is bound to be vague if it
has to fit the intuitive desiderata. Indeed, we can easily construct a soritical
series that takes us from a clear case where composition obtains (the fusion
of my current body cells, the relative distance among any two of them being
6less than n nanometers) to a case where composition would seem not to ob-
tain (the fusion of my current body cells, were their relative distance in-
creased to n kilometers), and the possibility of such a construction is a sign
of vagueness. With diachronic composition, says Sider, the picture ain’t no
better. As we have seen, there certainly is an object that at each time at
which I exist consists exactly of those body cells of mine that exist at that
time—namely my body. By contrast, it seems implausible to countenance
objects such as Shoemaker’s (1988) klables—objects that at each time in the
morning consist exactly of those molecules that at that time compose a table
in the kitchen and at each time in the afternoon consist exactly of the mole-
cules that at that time compose a table in the living room. So, intuitively
there are cases where composition clearly obtains (my body) and cases
where composition appears not to obtain (a klable). Yet, again, there is no
principled line to be drawn between the two sorts of cases. One can always
come up with a series of cases any two adjacent elements of which are
virtually indistinguishable, though the beginning of the series strikes us as a
clear case of composition while the end makes us queasy. Whether we under-
stand it synchronically or diachronically—the argument goes—restricted
composition is prone to the sorites paradox, hence it falls prey to vagueness.
So that’s the first point. Concerning the second point—to the effect
that the vagueness in question would be a case of ontological vagueness—
again Sider draws on Lewis, though Sider’s case is more carefully spelled out.
Lewis (1986, p. 212) simply says that vagueness of composition must be
ontological because the question of whether composition obtains can be
stated in a portion of our language that contains no semantically vague vo-
cabulary, but this, on the face of it, is circular. After all, the vocabulary of
mereology is needed to state the question, and to assume that this vocabu-
lary is semantically non-vague is to assume what has to be proved. Sider is
more careful here: he argues instead that the question of whether composi-
tion obtains can be stated in a portion of our language that contains only
logical vocabulary—quantifiers, individual variables, and identity—and no
parts of the logical vocabulary are semantically vague. More precisely, Sider
notes that if it ever were a vague matter whether composition obtains, then
some statements of the form “There are n objects” would be indeterminate in
truth-value, yet their indeterminacy could not be explained away semanti-
cally because they contain no non-logical vocabulary. This means that it
would be objectively indeterminate how many objects there are. And to say
7that it is objectively indeterminate how many objects there are is to say that
the world is indeterminate.
Putting the pieces together, the advertised claim now follows: Any
moderate answer to (Q) entails ontological vagueness. Since this sort of
vagueness is unacceptable—Sider argues—there is only one option left,
namely universalism. And according to Sider this is an option that only the
four-dimensionalist can afford. Three-dimensionalism is of a piece with mod-
eratism.
3. Problems and Loose Ends
Here, then, is the argument from vagueness in its entirety:
(1) There are three possible answers to the Diachronic Composition Ques-
tion— the nihilist, moderate, and universalist answers.
(2) The nihilist answer is untenable.
(3) Any moderate answer is untenable, for:
(3.1) any such answer is bound to be vague—for
(3.1.1) it is prone to the sorites paradox, and
(3.1.2) being sorites prone is a sign of vagueness;
(3.2) the relevant vagueness is ontological—for
(3.2.1) the question of whether composition obtains can be stated
in language that contains only logical vocabulary, and
(3.2.2) no parts of the logical vocabulary are semantically vague;
(3.3) ontological vagueness is untenable.
(4) Ergo, the universalist answer is the only acceptable option.
(5) This option is available to the four-dimensionalist.
(6) This option is not available to the three-dimensionalist.
(7) Ergo, four-dimensionalism affords a better metaphysics than three-
dimensionalism.
Why did I say that this is a defective argument? Formally it is valid, at least
insofar as the two main inferences are concerned—from (1)–(3) to (4) and
from (4)–(6) to (7). But it is an argument with many premises. And although
Sider has done a great job to back up some of them, there is still room for
several replies that are worth looking into. Let us go through them. But let us
do so with an eye at the costs involved in such replies. For, eventually the
question will be whether the three-dimensionalist can accept any of
8them—whether she can reject the argument and still claim faithfulness to
common sense.
3.1. The first inference
Let us begin with the inference from (1)–(3) to (4). Premise (1) is analytic,
hence uncontroversial. Premise (2) is not so straightforward, but it wears the
costs of its rejection on its sleeves, at least insofar as we are interested in a
comparison between three- and four-dimensionalism vis-à-vis common
sense. As we have already seen, a metaphysics according to which the world
consists of time-bound mereological atoms is beyond the point. So it is
premise (3) that carries the burden of the inference to (4), which is why Sider
himself devotes most of his efforts to a defense of this premise. We have
seen that this defense takes the form of a deductive argument based on the
three claims in (3.1)–(3.3). So in the end it is those claims that we have to
scrutinize.
Concerning the third of these claims—to the effect that ontological
vagueness is untenable—I don’t have much to say. This is obviously contro-
versial, but so be it: as with premise (2), claim (3.3) wears the costs of its
rejection on its sleeves. So let us focus on the other two claims.
The obvious reply to (3.1) is that restricted diachronic composition
need not be vague because, contrary to Sider’s argument for (3.1.1), it need
not fall pray to the sorites paradox. For one thing, one could simply insist
that whether composition obtains is a brute fact (see e.g. Markosian 1998,
2004). If it is a brute fact whether composition obtains, then every numerical
statement must have a definite truth-value and no soritical series could be
constructed to show the vagueness of restricted composition. On the other
hand, it is certainly hard to believe in brute facts on the grounds of a generic
appeal to common sense. So let’s put that way out aside. One could still ar-
gue as follows. What must be vague, on the face of it, is restricted composi-
tion at a time: there is no principled way of telling which mereological sums
exist at a given time, for everything is queer to a degree. This means that
composition-at-a-time must be fully unrestricted: given any number of ob-
jects existing at any time t, there is something that at t is composed exactly of
those objects and nothing else, whether we like it or not. But this is not to
say that we are forced to accept diachronic unrestricted composition as well,
i.e., the claim corresponding to the universalist answer (A3). Indeed there are
9principled ways one can rely on to support a more moderate answer corre-
sponding to option (A2). In particular, a three-dimensionalist can rely on the
criteria corresponding to the view that has come to be known as mereologi-
cal essentialism (Chisholm 1973). This is the view according to which an
object’s parts are all essential to it. On a diachronic reading, this means that
no object can gain or lose parts during its career: it is always composed of
the same things. And such things can be three-dimensional: the world would
consist exclusively of three-dimensional objects that are individuated by, and
whose persistence conditions are given by, their three-dimensional proper
parts. My body would not be such a thing, because the subatomic particles
that currently compose my body are different from those that composed it
yesterday. But the mereological aggregate of my current subatomic particles
is such a thing. Currently it happens to be organized so as to form my body,
yesterday it was somewhat more scattered, and a year ago it probably was
all over the places. Yet that thing exists now as it existed yesterday and a
year ago (or so we may suppose), hence at each time at which those particles
exist there is something—their mereological aggregate—that exists at that
time and is composed exactly of those particles, regardless of how the parti-
cles are arranged. (What we call ‘my body’, by contrast, is on this view a
mere façon de parler, an ens successivum: different things do duty for it at
different times.) So if we accept this view, then we have a perfectly clear cri-
terion for combining unrestricted synchronic composition with restricted
diachronic composition: given any number of objects existing at any given
time t, there is something that at t is composed exactly of those objects and
nothing else (unrestricted synchronic composition); but given various times
and various objects existing at each, a necessary and sufficient condition for
there to be something that at those times is composed of those objects is that
those objects be the same throughout. That is, in the precise terminology of
(Q), mereological essentialism affords the following instance of the moderate
answer (A2):
(A2') Given a class of time instants, I, and a function ƒ assigning a non-empty
class of objects, ƒ(t), to each t in I, a necessary and sufficient condition
for there to be an object that exists exactly at the times in I, and that at
each such time t is composed exactly by the objects in ƒ(t), is that ƒ(t)
comprises the same objects for each t in I.
This rules out unrestricted diachronic composition in a perfectly non-vague
language.
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Now, Sider is aware of this fact, so this is not a criticism ad personam.
In fact, elsewhere in his book Sider takes stock and gives his reasons for not
liking mereological essentialism precisely because “it is a three-dimensional
view that is untouched by my [Sider’s] argument from vagueness for four-
dimensionalism” (p. 180). But never mind that. Whatever reasons a four-
dimensionalist such as Sider may have to reject mereological essentialism,
what matters here is that a mereological essentialist can reject (3.1) and block
the argument at this juncture—and mereological essentialism embodies a
three-dimensionalist metaphysics. On the other hand, it is certainly appro-
priate to ask whether this is the sort of metaphysics that a three-dimen-
sionalist is allowed to offer vis-à-vis the common-sense picture of the world
that she aims to defend. And here the answer strikes me as obviously nega-
tive. As many philosophers have argued, the thought that ordinary objects
such as my body or Theseus’s ship are just entia successiva is certainly at
odds with common sense. One is free to go along with it if one deems the
other options unacceptable. But the grounds for such choice must be put on
the table: faithfulness to common sense is of no help in this context, just as it
is of no help if one decides to reject (3.1) by appealing to brute facts.
This leaves us with (3.2), namely with the claim that the vagueness of
restricted diachronic composition must be of the ontological sort. As we
have seen, Sider’s point is that vague composition implies the vagueness of
our logical vocabulary, as per (3.2.1). But why should the latter be a sign of
ontological vagueness? Here there is room for two sorts of misgiving. On the
one hand, one could reject claim (3.2.2), to the effect that no parts of the
logical vocabulary are semantically vague; on the other, one could accept that
claim and yet deny that the alternative here is between semantic and onto-
logical vagueness.
Let us begin from the second option. Consider a statement of the form
“There are n objects” and suppose that this statement lacks a definite truth-
value—it is neither determinately true nor determinately false. Even assum-
ing the semantic determinacy of the vocabulary, one need not attribute the
relevant indeterminacy to the way the world is (or isn’t). One could cash out
the relevant indeterminacy in epistemic terms. That is, one could say that it
is epistemically indeterminate how many objects there are: given various
times and various objects existing at each, either there is something that is
composed of all and only those objects at those times, or there isn’t—we
just cannot find out. I am not thinking here of an epistemicist account. In his
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book, Sider considers that possibility and rightly points out that the epis-
temicist account of vagueness does not sit well with the case at issue. As
Roy Sorensen (1988), Tim Williamson (1994), and other defenders have
stressed, the sharp cut-off points postulated by the account are not meant to
correspond to unexpected joints in reality. Rather, they would represent un-
anticipated powers of language users to draw what appear to be metaphysi-
cally arbitrary lines. Somehow, something about our meaning-fixing behavior
determines a sharp cut-off point where there seem to none—a cut-off that
we are not in a position to identify. Whether this is a plausible account is
irrelevant here. What is relevant is that if it works, it only works for the in-
determinacy of the non-logical vocabulary—the indeterminacy of predicates
such as ‘bald’ and of names such as ‘Everest’. When it comes to the logical
vocabulary, it is no longer a matter of use-meaning bridge laws. The existence
of a sharp cut-off would have to call for a metaphysical explanation, and that
goes beyond the scope of the epistemicist account. So, what I have in mind
when I speak of an epistemic account of the indeterminacy of a numerical
statement such as “There are n objects”, which consists exclusively of logical
vocabulary, is something else. It is genuine metaphysical ignorance. It feels
metaphysically arbitrary to draw the line somewhere and there is no way to
settle the matter, so it is impossible to attach a definite truth-value to our
numerical statement. Yet we should not blame the world for such ignorance:
the world is determinate; it’s our metaphysical dexterity that is limited. (I
think this is close to the view held by Hudson 2000.)
This way of rejecting the inference to (3.2), and therefore to (3),
strikes me as intelligible. But it does come at a price, too—namely, it em-
bodies a non-realist conception of truth that is by itself highly controversial.
Indeed, in order for the reply to go through, we need to accept a conception
of truth as superassertibility, or something along those lines. For only such a
conception would allow us to say that the impossibility to attach a truth-
value to a statement entails that the statement itself lacks a truth-value. On a
realist conception, ignorance has nothing to do with truth and falsity. If there
is a determinate number of objects, then on a realist conception of truth
every numerical statement has a definite truth-value, whether or not we are
capable of computing it—and this takes us back to the “brute facts” way out
mentioned above.
Consider now the other option. As I mentioned, this consists in re-
jecting (3.2) by explicitly rejecting (3.2.2), namely the claim that no parts of
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the logical vocabulary are semantically vague. Sider argues that this would be
wrong-headed because it would amount to the claim that the logical opera-
tors, among which the quantifiers, admit of multiple precisifications, when in
fact they do not. Sider’s reasons for this claim, however, are formally ques-
tionable. Let’s focus on the quantifiers, which is really what matters in the
present context. What is wrong with the thought that they admit of multiple
precisifications? Suppose there were two precisifications of the existential
quantifier, P1 and P2, which differ in their range. Then there would have to
be something, x, that is in the range of one, say P1, but not in the range of the
other, P2. Sider claims that this is impossible for the following reason: since
P2 lacks x in its range, it fails to be an acceptable precisification of the unre-
stricted universal quantifier. “It quite clearly is a restricted quantifier since
there is something—x—that fails to be in its extension” [p. 129]. This is in-
correct, and for a reason that Sider himself considers and yet rejects. The rea-
son is that the phrase ‘there is’—as it occurs in the above quotation—is am-
biguous. Why should we take it to range over a domain that includes x? To
do so would be to identify this phrase with the existential quantifier as pre-
cisified by P1. But why so? On pain of circularity, there is no “Archimedean
point”—as Sider himself puts it—from which to claim that P2 is a restricted
quantifier. There is genuine competition between P1 and P2, and this compe-
tition affects the meaning to be attached to the phrase ‘there is’. Sider says
that it is hard to understand what these precisifications are supposed to be,
but on the face of it there is a perfectly clear semantic model on the table:
broadly understood, supervaluationism is in no way committed to the
thought that the domain of quantification must be fixed as we go from one
precisification to another (see Skyrms 1968.)
I think this line of objection should not be underestimated. Once again,
however, the question that concerns us here is not merely the existence of a
weak spot in the vagueness argument. The question is whether this spot rep-
resents a weakness in the argument that a three-dimensionalist can delve into
and build on. For what is the price of this move? On the one hand, to say
that the quantifiers are vague is to say that there is vagueness in the ontologi-
cally significant portion of our language, and to many philosophers this is
just a different way of saying that there is ontic vagueness. On the other
hand, one could cash out the relevant vagueness in terms of competing con-
ceptual schemes. Different precisifications would correspond to different
schemes—different models of the world. But unless one takes this to mean
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that all quantification is restricted insofar as each conceptual scheme is par-
tial—a claim that would leave no room for the sort of quantification that de-
serves a place in the logical vocabulary—the consequence of this view would
be a radical form of relativism according to which what there is depends on
what we think and how we talk. That is not an option that can be ruled out a
priori—many philosophers sympathize with this sort of relativism (with
various qualifications, as in Sosa 1999 or Hirsch 2002). But it certainly is not
an option that can be justified by mere appeal to common sense.
3.2. The second inference
So much for the first half of the argument. Let us now move to the second,
namely the inference from (4)–(6) to (7). Assuming universalism is indeed
the only acceptable answer to the Diachronic Composition Question, what
justifies the twofold claim that this answer is available to the four-dimen-
sionalist (premise (5)) but not to the three-dimensionalist (premise (6))?
That the four-dimensionalist has this option is, I think, uncontrover-
sial. Since Quine (1950), four-dimensionalism has often been formulated pre-
cisely as a view to the effect that any filled region of space-time is the total
career of some object, indeed that any filled region of space-time is an object.
So premise (5) is all right. But what about (6)? What prevents a three-
dimensionalist from holding a parallel view? Note that Sider is very careful in
phrasing (Q) in such a way as not to beg the question. The universalist an-
swer (A3) does not say that, given various times and various objects existing
at each, there is sure to exist a diachronic mereological fusion of all those ob-
jects. It says that, given various times and various objects existing at each,
there is sure to be something that exists at each of those times and that at
each such time is composed of the corresponding objects. In other words, the
universalist answer corresponding to (A3) is just a temporalized version of a
principle of plenitude concerning the existence of mereological fusions. But
as Kathrin Koslicki (2003) and Jonathan Lowe (2005) have pointed out,
there is no obvious reason why such a temporalized plenitude principle can-
not be accepted (on a suitable understanding of ‘temporalized’) by a mere-
ologically promiscuous three-dimensionalist as well. Judith Thomson (1983),
for instance, is such a philosopher.
On my reckoning, this is actually the strongest reply one could put
forward against the argument from vagueness as a whole. For even granting
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the inference from (1)–(3) to (4)—on which most of the debate has
focused—it simply is not clear why one should take the case for universal-
ism to be a case for four-dimensionalism. Surprisingly, Sider says nothing
explicit about this in his book. And in his 2003 reply to Koslicki, he only
offers a parenthetic remark: by implying the existence of arbitrary minimal
diachronic fusions, universalism implies the existence of instantaneous ob-
jects (among other things)— entities which three-dimensionalists like Thom-
son reject. This may well be true in respect of Thomson. But I don’t see
why a promiscuous three-dimensionalist should in principle be opposed to
countenancing instantaneous objects as a special case. Even if we stress the
importance of common sense, as we have been doing so far, I don’t see any
reason to think that such momentary entities should be deemed repulsive.
Some things last long, some last for a short time. Some might just last the
span of an instant. Sider adds: “I suspect that most [three-dimensionalists]
would react thus: ‘If I needed to accept that (ubiquitous instantaneous ob-
jects), I might as well concede any remaining differences and accept four-di-
mensionalism’” (2003, p. 136). I see the point, but mostly as a rhetorical
move. For all that has been said, the three-dimensionalist may not concede
the remaining differences and block the argument right at this juncture.
Still, suppose a three-dimensionalist is willing to go this far. Suppose
she is willing to accept the promiscuous ontology required by her adherence
to (A3), with instantaneous objects along with all sorts of gerrymandered
persisting beasts. The outcome, I claim, would be a metaphysics that is
committed either to contingent identity or else to massive co-location—and
these are views that cry for justification. For consider what happens. Let t1
and t2 be two distinct times, and consider two different assignments, ƒ and
ƒ', such that ƒ(t1) = ƒ'(t1) and ƒ(t2) ≠ ƒ'(t2). For instance, ƒ(t1) and ƒ'(t1) could
be the class of those body cells of mine that exist at a given time, t1, whereas
ƒ(t2) and ƒ'(t2) could comprise those cells that compose my body and Ted
Sider’s body, respectively, a moment later, at t2. Intuitively, this is a scenario
in which a certain entity, a, changes from t1 to t2 by replacing my earlier
body cells with my later body cells, and a certain entity, b, changes from t1
to t2 by replacing my earlier body cells with Sider’s later body cells. What
are we to say of such entities, a and b? For the four-dimensionalist, the an-
swer is straightforward. We have two persisting entities, two distinct four-
dimensional worms that have different temporal parts and occupy different
regions of space-time, though at t1 they occupy the same region of space and
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have the same spatial parts. There is nothing special about this, just as there
is nothing special about the fact that the left-branching portion of a Y-shaped
object, for example, partially overlaps (at the bottom) its right-branching
portion: two things with a common part. The three-dimensionalist cannot
put it this way, though, because she rejects temporal parts and, with them,
the analogy between space and time that makes the four-dimensionalist ac-
count so straightforward. For a three-dimensionalist, a and b are entities that
exist in their entirety at t1 and continue to exist in their entirety at t2. So how
are they related?
There are two options. The first is to say that a and b are identical at t1 (for
they are composed exactly of the same parts and occupy exactly the same
region of space) but distinct at t2 (they are composed of different parts and
occupy different regions of space). This is to accept contingent identity, or
rather “occasional identity” (Gallois 1998), a view that can hardly be attrib-
uted to common sense. Alternatively, the three-dimensionalist can say that a
and b are distinct not only at t2, but also at t1. That is, at t1 they are distinct
though fully coincident, both mereologically and spatially. This does away
with contingent identity, but it means that the mereologically promiscuous
three-dimensionalist is forced to give up an important principle that is often
taken to be part and parcel of common sense—the Lockean principle of iden-
tity in terms of spatial location. In fact, this is just the beginning. For of
course, not only would we have two things, a and b, perfectly coinciding at
t1. On this view, there would be lots of things perfectly coinciding at t1: one
for each possible assignment ƒk such that ƒk(t1) = ƒ(t1). And on any reason-
able count, there are uncountably many such assignments. To put it vividly
suppose t1 is the present instant. As you are looking at these body cells of
mine, you would in fact be looking at uncountably many things—things that
are indiscernible and yet would differ from one another by virtue of differ-
ences that will manifest themselves at a later time. They would differ be-
cause different are the things they will turn into (whereas on the four-
dimensional account you would of course be looking at just one thing, ex-
actly as you would be looking at one thing were you looking at the bottom
portion of a Y-shaped object). Even more vividly consider the career of my
body from time t1 to time t2. During this interval, my body undergoes mere-
ological change, so let ƒ(ti) be the class of body cells constituting my body at
ti, for each ti between t1 and t2 included. Surely the thought that ƒ has a dia-
chronic fusion, call it x, is germane to the common-sense picture of change.
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But in addition to x, universalism implies the existence of a continuum of en-
tities whose career is progressively shorter than that of x, up to the instanta-
neous entity that exists only at t1. All of these entities are fully present at
each time at which they exist and yet distinct. And since they all exist at t1,
at t1 we must acknowledge the existence of continuously many, perfectly co-
located things. Consistent as it might be, this picture of change certainly
strikes me as one that a three-dimensionalist can hardly accept. At least, it
strikes me as a picture that cries for a metaphysical justification that com-
mon sense cannot deliver.
Conclusion
Let us wind things up. Here is the list of all the options we have considered
to block the “vagueness argument”:
(a) Reject premise (2) and accept nihilism.
(b) Reject premise (3) by rejecting (3.1); this amounts to accepting either
brute facts (contrary to (3.1.1)) or else some radical view such as mere-
ological essentialism (also contrary to (3.1.1)).
(c) Reject premise (3) by rejecting (3.2); this amounts to accepting either a
non-realist account of truth (if (3.2.2) is accepted) or a radical form of
relativism (if (3.2.2) is rejected).
(d) Reject premise (3) by rejecting (3.3); this amounts to accepting plain on-
tological vagueness.
(e) Reject premise (6) and accept either contingent identity or massive co-
location.
On my reckoning, these are the only options. They are not few, and for this
reason the argument is not a straight knock-down in favor of four-
dimensionalism. But neither are these options of a piece with common sense.
On the contrary, some of them are quite at odds with the pre-analytic pic-
ture of the world that three-dimensionalism is meant to reflect. If this is
right, then it seems to me that the defensive strategy of the three-
dimensionalist has better improve. Adherence to common sense is a deside-
ratum. But something has to give, and it is by no means obvious that the
price to be paid by a three-dimensionalist will be inferior to the revisionary
move so kindly advocated by four-dimensionalists.*
* Many thanks to Fabrice Correia and Philipp Keller for their comments on earlier versions.
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